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The past two decades have seen a reviving interest in logical empiricism. Distance
in time typically engenders the equanimity characteristic of the historical atti-
tude. The historical perspective mellows old front lines and tends to transform
previous warfare into nuanced analysis and more detached consideration. After
Karl Popper's attacks an Rudolf Carnap have shifted away from the philosophical
combat zones and alter the battle smoke of the fighting over theory change, as ini-
tiated by Thomas Kuhn's paradigm approach, has cleared, it is precisely this his-
torical attitude that has begun to dominate the study of logical empiricism. If
winning or losing is no longer the issue, the woodcut type approach of marked
contrasts gives way to expounding multifaceted shades and variegation. Continuing
scholarly occupation with logical empiricism has brought to light a wide variety
of views among its advocates and has shown that there never was anything like a
monolithic Viennese ideology. Moreover, it never was the primary objective of
logical empiricists to debunk statements as meaningless gibberish. Rather, the top
of the agenda was characterized by more positive challenges. For instance, the
double-language model paved the way to the eventual recognition of a genuine
contribution of theory to conferring meaning to scientific terms (Irzik and Grün-
berg 1995, 289-90). In sum, logical empiricism was more contrasting and more
modern than its opponents would have it.
1 wish to broaden this recent reevaluation of logical empiricism by bringing
confirmation theory into the picture. Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and Carl Hempel
contributed to laying the foundations of present-day confirmation theory. So it was
logical empiricists, among others, who planted the seeds that were later brought
to fruition.
Reshaping the Ground in Confirmation Theory
Conventional wisdom has it that science provides us with insights that are more
accurate and more trustworthy than the commonsense views we entertain in every-
day life. Most of us are willing to grant a high degree of credibility to scientific
tenets. The reason is that we take such tenets to be better confirmed than the usual
folklore, which in turn places the issue of the nature of scientific confirmation an
the agenda.
Let me prepare my sketch presentation of logical-empiricist contributions to
this issue by delineating in broad strokes the most striking lines in the develop-
ment of confirmation theory. This development is characterized by two peaks, sep-
arated by a period of roughly two decades in which the relevant interest dropped to
a low. The ferst peak extends from roughly 1930 to 1960 and includes the relevant
work of logical empiricists. Outstanding among them are Reichenbach's Experience
and Prediction (1938), Hempel's "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" (1945), and
Carnap's Logical Foundations of Probability (1950). All these accounts placed the
logical or probabilistic relationship between a hypothesis and a piece of evidence
at the center of consideration. It was asked whether or to which degree a given Ob-
servation report was capable of supporting a given assumption. Within this
framework it was conceded at once that general theories are in need of empirical
assessment as well. However, the evaluation of individual hypotheses was consid-
ered primary. Overarching theories were construed as collections of hypotheses so
that the Support of the former was thought to be derivable from the confirmation
of the latter.
The publication of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) shifted the
focus to a different ground and initiated a distinct approach to the evaluation of
scientific achievements. Let me call this approach the tradition of theory change,
as opposed to confirmation theory proper. Kuhn regarded the issue of the viabil-
ity of comprehensive theoretical traditions or paradigms as the fundamental one.
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The evaluation of individual hypotheses was held to be inextricably tied up with
the credibility of the associated paradigm. Thus, the theory-change tradition re-
placed the emphasis an individual assumptions by a holistic approach according
to which large-scale theories constitute the primary object of scientific assessment.
Second, the historical development of a theory was considered essential in addi-
tion. In the Kuhnian framework, the paradigmatic principles are decreed exempt
from critical examination during the periods of normal science but might well be
subjected to severe tests in the times of crisis or imminent revolution (Kuhn 1962,
35-37, 66-68).
Imre Lakatos's methodology represents another approach within the theory-
change tradition. According to Lakatos, one of the chief measures of acceptability
is whether a theory manages to anticipate relevant data or whether it merely ac-
commodates observations after their discovery and only responds to anomalies.
Although two theories might be able to account for the same set of data, their sup-
port by these data might yet be different. If one of the theories predicted the rele-
vant findings while the other had to be adapted to new problems and fitted to
known results, the former is buttressed more strongly by these data than the latter
(Lakatos 1970, 32-36; Carrier 2002).
In sum, there is a twofold contrast between confirmation theory and the the-
ory-change tradition as to the evaluation of scientific achievements. First, confir-
mation theory considers the appraisal of individual hypotheses in light of the
relevant evidence as the core and kernel of judging scientific merit. The tradition
of theory change, by contrast, places comprehensive theories at the focus and re-
gards confirmation as a profoundly holistic endeavor. Second, confirmation theory
distinguishes logical or probabiistic relations between the data and the theoretical
claims as exclusively relevant for assessing these claims. The theory-change tradi-
tion, an the other hand, additionally features historical patterns of development
and temporal relations between the enunciation of a theory and the discovery of
the pertinent empirical effects.
The thriving of the theory-change tradition corresponded to the eclipse of
conf rmation theory. The latter was revived after about 198o when interest in theory
change began to fade. This period constitutes the beginning of the second peak of
conftrmation theory. It is characterized, first, by Clark Glymour's bootstrap model
of confirmation, which takes up essential principles from Hempel's entaihnent
approach, and, second and predominantly, by Bayesian confirmation theory, which
incorporates elements of the probabilistic accounts of Carnap and Reichenbach.
In each case the later theories owe much to their logical-empiricist sources. Con-
firmation theory can be regarded as a thoroughly cumulative endeavor. When
confirmation began to re-attract attention and the second peak came into view,
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the work was resumed at the locus, where it was dropped decades ago. Today's
theories of confirmation have smoothly grown out of their logical-empiricist
predecessors. My chief example is Hempel's approach, which profoundly shaped
the bootstrap model. Bot let me begin by offering some remarks an the joint char-
acteristics of probabilistic theories of confirmation.
Probabilism in Confirmation Theory
Underlying all relevant approaches is the attempt to clarify confirmation by tak-
ing advantage of the probability calculus. Degrees of confirmation are intended to
be captured by the probability of a hypothesis in light of the available evidence.
The differences between Carnap and Reichenbach, an the one hand, and present-
day Bayesianism, which largely goes back to Bruno de Finetti, an the other, pre-
dominantly concern two aspects. Bayesianism of this sort is characterized, first, by
the commitment to Bayes's theorem as the measure of empirical support and, sec-
ond, by the subjective interpretation of the relevant probabilities (and of prior
probabilities in particular). Probabilities of hypotheses are supposed to rely an or
to merely express personal belief strengths that are only constrained by the condi-
tion that their relations are in agreement with the probability calculus (Howson
and Urbach 1989, 10, 67).
On both counts, Carnap and Reichenbach held dissenting views. Their ap-
proaches to confirmation differ in detail but agree an invoking the theorem of con-
ditional probability rather than Bayes's theorem, and an trying to confer objective
meaning to all relevant probabilities. Carnap's inductive logic employs language-
dependent measures of the ratio of the favorable cases to the possible ones;
Reichenbach's approach is based an frequentist assumptions. Adopting Bayes's
theorem rather than conditional probability marks an important improvement
but does not indicate an in-principle change. Bayes's theorem features the likeli-
hood or expectedness of data, which is crucial to the reconstruction of theory
choice and theory change. Still, this is a technical point that in no way indicates
a switch in the fundamental orientation. In this vein, Colin Howson and Peter
Urbach, in their now standard account of Bayesianism, regard Bayesian confirma-
tion theory as the continuation of inductive logic by other means (Howson and
Urbach 1989, 290; Howson 1997, 278).
The gap between the objective probabilities of the empiricist tradition and the
subjective probabilities of standard Bayesianism is deeper and has wider ramifica-
tions. Still, there are factions in the present debate, Wesley Salmon prominently
among them, who advocate an objective interpretation of probabilities within the
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Bayesian framework (Salmon 1967,115-31; Salmon 1990,180-87). All in all, there is
a striking continuity between the early and the modern debates. In spite of super-
ficial dissimilarities, strong conceptual ties bind Carnap's views of confirmation
to latter-day Bayesianism. This bears testimony to the fecundity of logical empiri-
cism. In confrrmation theory logical empiricism was not abandoned but gradually
transformed. Probabilistic confirmation theory proceeded along smooth lines.
Hempel's Entailment Account of Hypothesis Confirmation
1 want to support this claim of gradual transformation by reviewing one example
more extensively and more carefully. This example concerns the relationship be-
tween Hempel's entailment account of confirmation and Glymour's bootstrap
model. So 1 set aside the Brand lines for the moment and give a more detailed ac-
count of what 1 take tobe the salient aspects of the transition.
Hempel's account of confirmation is based an the intuition that a hypothe-
sis is confirmed by its positive instances rather than its consequences-as the
hypothetico-deductive approach has it. Hypothetico-deductive confirmation in-
volves the derivation of the data from tentatively presumed assumptions. If these
empirical consequences are found in experience, the theoretical premises of the
deduction are considered confirmed. Thus, the key to hypothetico-deductivism is
what Hempel calls the "converse consequence condition." This condition stipulates
that if an observation report e confirms a hypothesis h, which is in turn implied
by another hypothesis h* (that is, h* => h), then e also confirms W. In the hypo-
thetico-deductive framework, it is in virtue of this condition that pieces of evi-
dence are able to bear out general theories. Suppose the observation of a freely
falling body can be accounted for by the law of free fall and thus confirms this law.
Since the law is a consequence of Newtonian mechanics (drawing an appropriate
initial and boundary conditions in addition), the observation supports the over-
arching theory as well. Hempel rejects the converse consequence condition. His
objection is that the hypothetico-deductive approach is circular: the move from the
correctness of the consequences to the soundness of the premises is nondeductive
and for this reason in need of justification. However, any such justification pre-
supposes the very concept of confirmation one is about to establish in the first place
(Hempel 1945, 28-29,32-33).
Hempel's objective is to give an explication of a qualitative relation of confir-
mation that moreover is, in contrast to hypothetico-deductivism, deductively valid.
The aim is to clarify what it means that a piece of evidence e confirms a hypothe-
sis h: c(h,e). Hempel's suggestion is that confirmation involves the derivation of
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the hypothesis from the data rather than the other way around. The basic relation
is instantiation: hypotheses are confirmed by their positive instances. An instance
of a hypothesis is characterized by the fact that variables contained in it are re-
placed by individual constants. That is, Vx (Px -* Qx) is a hypothesis; Pa A Qa is a
positive instance. These instances are observation statements; they ascribe certain
properties to individual objects. The general assumption that all pixies are quirky
is instantiated by Archibald, the quirky pixy. Observation statements are critical to
confirmation; hypotheses are appraised an their basis. The key intuition is cap-
tured by Hempel's "entailment condition: Any sentence which is entailed by an ob-
servation report is confirmed by it" (Hempel 1945, 31; my emphasis). That is, a
hypothesis is confirmed if instantiations of this hypothesis follow from the data.
However, as Hempel proceeds, this account has the awkward consequence
that confirmation relations may depend an the formulation of a hypothesis. In
particular, logically equivalent hypotheses may come out confirmed differently by
the Same data. Consider the contrapositive to the mentioned schematic hypothe-
sis: Vx (-Qx - -Px). What is nonquirky is not a pixy. This version is no longer
instantiated by Archibald, the quirky pixy. The evidence which supported the
hypothesis is confirmatooy neutral to its contrapositive reformulation. Hempel
considered this feature an unacceptable flaw of his model and suggested fixing it
by adopting the "equivalence condition" as an additional constraint (Hempel 1945,
13, 31). lt says that logically equivalent hypotheses are confirmed by the same evi-
dence: If c(h,e) and h r=> h* then c(h*,e). Accepting this further condition means
that instantiation is merely sufficient, not necessary, for confirmation. If a hypothe-
sis remains noninstantiated but is equivalent to a positively instantiated one, the
former receives empirical backing as well.
A further condition brings out the Spirit of Hempel's account more distinctly.
This "special consequence condition" says: "If an observation report confirms a hy-
pothesis h, then it also confirms every consequence of h" (Hempel 1945, 31). Hempel
argues that this condition should be obvious. Deriving consequences from a state-
ment does no more than making the content of this statement explicit. It should
be clear, then, that the logical consequences of a confirmed hypothesis are con-
firmed themselves.' It thus militates against the adequacy of the hypothetico-de-
ductive approach to confirmation that the special consequence condition comes
out violated within its framework. If hypothesis h entails evidence e, it is by no
means guaranteed that a weaker hypothesis h' that follows from h still entails e
(Hempel 1945, 31-32).
These considerations make it clear that the converse consequence condition,
an the one hand, and the entailment and special consequence conditions, an the
other, are conceptually antagonistic. They belong to divergent approaches to
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confirmation-namely, traditional hypothetico-deductivism and Hempel's entaIl-
ment account, respectively. In particular, it is impossible simply to conjoin all three
conditions. The result would be that each observation e would support a com-
pletely arbitrary hypothesis h. Here is the argument: e entails and thus confirms
itself; hence, in virtue of converse consequence, it also supports e A h which, by
dint of special consequence, implies the confirmation of h (Hempel 1945, 32; Car-
nap 1950, 474). Consequently, the two sets of conditions have tobe kept separate.'
Hempel specifies one more requirement, namely, the "consistency condition."
One of the clauses attached to this condition says that all the hypotheses an ob-
servation Statement (which is not self-contradictory) confirms are logically com-
patible with one another. Given the special consequence condition, there is no
way to avoid the demand for consistency. If an observation Statement supported
two incompatible hypotheses, it also confirmed all the consequences of this con-
tradiction. But anything is entailed by a contradictory premise. The acceptance of
a violation of the consistency condition would amount to regarding arbitrary hy-
potheses as confirmed. This is an unwholesome result that needs to be ruled out
(Hempel 1965, 33-34).
Hempel proceeds by specifying a conception of confirmation that satisfies
these three conditions. The challenge is to show that general hypotheses are sub-
ject to confirmation in this sense by observation reports. The pivot of Hempel's
conception is the notion of the "development of a hypothesis." The development
serves to unfold the content of the hypothesis for a finite dass of objects. The devel-
opment represents a list of the cases to which the hypothesis is supposed to apply.
This is achieved by substituting the variables in the hypothesis by the relevant in-
dividual constants. Consider the hypothesis "all swans are white" or Vx (Sx - Wx)
for a finite claes of objects {a, b, c}. The development of this hypothesis is: (Sa -
Wa) A (Sb - Wb) A (Sc - Wc). Hempel's condition of "direct confirmation" says:
An observation statement e directly confirms a hypothesis h, if e entails the devel-
opment of h for those objects that are mentioned in e. Let the observation state-
ment be: Sa A Wa, "Albert is a swan and Albert is white." It implies the first clause
of the development, which is the only one that mentions Albert.3 It follows that the
hypothesis is directly confirmed by the observation report (Hempel 1945, 36-37).
The idea underlying the entailment account is to conceive of confirmation as
deduction of positive instances of a hypothesis from the data. This idea is realized
using the notion of development. The point is that hypotheses are of a general na-
ture, whereas observation statements refer to individuals. Thus, the latter cannot
imply a general claim. The development serves to remove the universal quantifier
from the hypothesis and to make its content explicit for each of the relevant objects.
The key to confirmation is that an observation report entails the entire content of
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the hypothesis with respect to the objects the report refers to. The hypothesis says
no more as to these objects than the report does. This is why the observations are
capable of confirming general hypotheses.4
As yet, Hempel has delivered precisely what he had advertised: a qualitative
relation of confirmation that is deductively valid. The conception of deriving the
relevant parts of the development of a hypothesis makes it transparent how a
piece of evidence can possibly bear an a general assumption in a logically sound
fashion. In contrast, it is obvious that this procedure cannot capture all there is to
confirmation in the sciences. After all, scientific evaluation draws an judgments of
the kind of how well a hypothesis is doing in light of the available evidence. This
goes beyond assessments such as that a given piece of evidente supports a given
hypothesis. What is needed is a comparative or quantitative concept of confirma-
tion. In order to tackle this task, Hempel takes recourse to auxiliary criteria that
have a traditional ring. The overall confirmation of a hypothesis, namely, is said to
depend an the amount of confirming instances, the simplicity of the hypothesis,
and its coherence with other relevant assumptions (Hempel 1945, 41-42). At this
juncture, the nondeductive aspects of the confirmation process resurge.
Shortcomings of Hempel's Account
Let me highlight two shortcomings of Hempel's account that turned out to be sig-
nificant for its transformation into the bootstrap model. First, the notion of de-
velopment requires that hypotheses are couched in observational terms. There is
no development of theoretical hypotheses. The reason is that the development of
a hypothesis is supposed to catalog the observational content of this hypothesis. But
without assistance of further assumptions, a hypothesis such as "the wavelength
of red light is 700 nm" lacks observational content. Wavelengths are not accessible
to the unaided human senses so that auxiliary assumptions are needed for endow-
ing the hypothesis with empirical indications. It follows that no observation State-
ment is able to entail, all by itself, the relevant content of a theoretical hypothesis.
The dependence of the observational content of a hypothesis an additional
assumptions makes it impossible to unambiguously develop a theoretical hypothe-
sis into the list of its empirical instantiations. A theoretical quantity can be meas-
ured by a multiplicity of methods. Current intensity, for instance, can be evaluated
using electromagnetic interaction or electrochemical effects. In both cases the ob-
servational indications are disparate. It follows that one and the Same hypothesis
may translate into the observation report e1, if auxiliary hl is invoked, or, alterna-
tively, into observation report e2, if auxiliary h2 is resorted to. This change in the
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empirical indications, depending an which further assumptions are adduced, vi-
tiates considering both reports as simply bringing out the observational content
of the hypothesis. Not a single, unambiguous development is attached to the hy-
pothesis, but rather a context-dependent multitude of disparate observational in-
dications (Earman 1992, 68; Earman and Salmon 1992, 52).
Another trouble of Hempel's lies with the consistency condition. This condi-
tion requires that a given piece of evidence can only confirm hypotheses that are
compatible with one another. But consider the notorious problem of fitting a curve
to measurement results. The problem is that a given set of measurement values
may lead to a number of distinct, incompatible hypotheses as to the underlying law.
More than one curve can sensibly be drawn through a cloud of points represent-
ing the measurement results. One might assume that all the hypotheses instanti-
ated by these results are supported by the results. But this prima-facie plausible
judgment is ruled out by the consistency condition. Hempel grants the objection
(Hempel 1945, 33), which makes Carnap wonder why Hempel sticks to a condition
faced with such "a clear refutation" (Carnap 1950, 476). In the 1964 postscript to
his seminal 1945 paper, Hempel acknowledged his predicament. He conceded, an
the one hand, that the curve-fit objection seems "to carry considerable weight,"
but he insisted, an the other, that giving up consistency would be tantamount to
abandoning the condition of special consequence as well-which went against the
grain of the instantiation approach (Hempel 1945 [1964], 49). In fact, if the special
consequence condition is retained, the confirmation of two incompatible hypothe-
ses by the Same data would imply that all the consequences of these hypotheses were
confirmed as well-which would mean to regard arbitrary hypotheses as con-
firmed. Given the special consequence condition, preservation of the consistency
condition is inevitable.
This finding may raise doubts as to whether special consequence is a kosher
condition. In fact, closer inspection reveals that it is not. It gives rise to two
paradoxes-namely, the conjunctive and the disjunctive irrelevance paradox. For
the conjunctive paradox, consider the hypothesis: "trout are gill-breathing and spar-
rows are warm-blooded." The observation of the gill-breathing trout Frederick
counts as a positive instance of this hypothesis. Actually, an observation report to
this effect implies everything the hypothesis says an the objects mentioned in the
report-as demanded by Hempel. So we may conclude that the hypothesis is con-
firmed by the observation statement. Further, the hypothesis can be considered as
a conjunction of two partial claims, one referring to trout and the other to sparrows.
Each of these partial claims, and the one an sparrows, in particular, follows from
the comprehensive assumption. That sparrows are warm-blooded is a special
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consequence of the hypothesis that trout are gill-breathing and sparrows are warm-
blooded. In virtue of the special consequence condition, the observation of a gill-
breathing trout should support the presumption that sparrows are warm-blooded.
Drawing a little an the machinery of formal logic, the conjunctive irrelevance
paradox amounts to the following. Let the hypothesis be: Vx [ (Tx - Gx) A (Sx -
Wx)]. The observation report may be: Tf A Gf. On Hempel's account, this State-
ment counts as a positive instance and thus as a confirmation of the hypothesis. A
special consequence of the hypothesis is: Vx (Sx - Wx), which is thus supported
by the evidence as well.s
The disjunctive paradox is similarly structured. Take the hypothesis "trout
are gill-breathing" and assume it to be confirmed by the observation of trout
Frederick. Among the special consequences of this empirically confirmed hypoth-
esis is the assumption that "trout are gill-breathing or sparrows are warm-
blooded." Classical logic permits us to weaken a claim by appending another
clause through disjunction. The truth of an assumption entails that this assump-
tion or some other is true. Consequently, judging by Hempel's lights, the disjunc-
tive hypothesis should be confirmed by the observation as well-albeit the second
disjunct is not supported separately.
Again speaking in terms of formal logic, let the hypothesis be represented by
the expression'dx (Tx - Gx), with the supporting evidence Tf A Gf. The hypoth-
esis implies: Vx [(Tx - Gx) v (Sx - Wx)], which disjunction is likewise con-
firmed by the evidence in virtue of the special consequence condition.
Thus, the special consequence condition issues licenses for appending irrele-
vant clauses to hypotheses and having them confirmed by evidence relating to the
original hypothesis. Irrelevant clauses turn out to be free riders of confirmation.
Actually, the conjunctive irrelevance paradox is known to haunt hypothetico-
deductivism.b The special consequence condition serves to import the conjunctive
paradox into the entailment account, for one, and to bring forth the disjunctive
paradox, for another.
Basics of the Bootstrap Model
The bootstrap model, as suggested by Glymour in 1980, owes its fundamental ap-
proach to confirmation to Hempel's account but substantially alters most of the
technical machinery of the latter. Glymour accepts Hempel's basic idea to place
qualitative confirmation at the top and to characterize confirmed hypotheses as
being entailed by the data. The most important changes concern the conception
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of the development and the special consequence condition. Both are replaced
by what I call the "overall instantiation requirement." Let me briefly sketch these
modifications.
Within the general framework of the entailment account, the confirmation of
hypotheses is appraised by examining their positive or negative instances. On the
one hand, Glymour's bootstrap model involves a liberalization of Hempel's Je-
mands in that it permits one to perform the derivation of such instances by draw-
ing an additional principles. That is, the hypotheses to be confirmed need no
longer be couched in observational vocabulary; they need no longer be translat-
able into the collection of their empirical instances. Rather, it is acknowledged that
hypotheses may be expressed in theoretical terms so that their instances could only
be identified using auxiliary suppositions. This means that the notion of the devel-
opment of a hypothesis is dropped and that, consequently, the theory-ladenness of
empirical confirmation is recognized. On the other hand, Glymour tightens the
demands in requiring that the values of all the quantities in the hypothesis in
question are fixed uniquely by the evidence and that the agreement between the
data and the hypothesis was not guaranteed in advance an logical grounds.
More specifically, an empirical test of a hypothesis is performed by produc-
ing a positive or, as the case may be, negative instance of it. In such an instantia-
tion of a hypothesis all the variables figuring in it have assumed definite values. If
these values match the hypothesis, the instantiation is positive; if not, it is nega-
tive. Hypotheses are confirmed by their positive instantiations and discredited by
their negative ones. As a rule, the quantities in scientific hypotheses are not di-
rectly observable but need to be inferred from the data using additional assump-
tions. The auxiiary assumptions serve to furnish instantiations of hypotheses
couched in theoretical terms. A positive instantiation is disqualified as a confir-
mation if the nature of the situation ruled out the appearance of a negative one.
Bootstrap confirmation is thus characterized by the following conditions.
1. Overall instantiation: Each quantity in the hypothesis in question has been
unambiguously evaluated an the basis of the data and by eventual recourse
to auxiliary assumptions.
2. Positive instantiation: the values are in agreement with the hypothesis.
3. Risk of failure: accordance between data and hypothesis is not made sure by
the logical characteristics of the test (Glymour 1980,114-23; 130-32).
The adoption of the overall instantiation requirement marks the crossroads where
Glymour parts Hempel's company. In virtue of this commitment, instantiation
becomes necessary for confirmation (and is not alone sufficient as in Hempel).
The recognition of theory-ladenness calls for the adoption of an auxiliary
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condition. If arbitrary assumptions were allowed to be employed for producing
positive instances of a hypothesis, the instantiation requirement could be trivially
satisfied. The auxiliary condition demands that the ancillary assumptions used in
instantiating a hypothesis be confirmed themselves. If this was meant to say that
each bootstrap confirmation needs to rely an bootstrap-confirmed hypotheses,
an infinite regress would ensue. But Glymour specifies three options for judging
particular hypotheses without prior recourse to bootstrap confirmation. First,
some hypotheses can be supported by applying them twice to the Same situation.
One can employ the ideal-gas law for evaluating the gas constant and check the
invariance of this constant by drawing an another application of the Same law
(Glymour 1980, in, 121-22,140; Mitchell 1995, 244; see, however, Culler 1995). That
is, a hypothesis is used as its own auxiliary hypothesis. Second, under suitable cir-
cuinstances it can be decided in a noncircular fashion that a hypothesis is not
confirmed. The bootstrap conditions imply that a hypothesis remains unsupported
if either definite values cannot be obtained for all relevant quantities an the basis
of the data or if these evaluations are not liable to risk of failure (Glymour 198o,
118-21,134-35,143). Third, a "concordance procedure" can be used for establishing
the mutual support of auxiliary assumptions, none of which is bootstrap confirmed
in advance. In this case one and the same theoretical quantity is evaluated by rely-
ing an different auxiliary hypotheses or different data sets. If the results of these
calculations are in agreement with one another, the correctness of the relevant an-
cillary assumptions employed is thereby buttressed (Glymour 1980, 122-23; see
Carrier 1994, 52-55).
1 will not go into these ramifications but will focus an the bearing of the over-
all instantiation condition. This condition is apt to dissolve both the conjunctive
and the disjunctive irrelevance paradox. The reason is that the requirement makes
it impossible to regard hypotheses or their consequences as empirically supported
if one of the relevant variables falls to be uniquely determined by the data. The
conjunctive paradox is removed an the grounds that evidence relating only to
partial claims entertained in a hypothesis is disqualified as confirmation of the
entire hypothesis. Data an trout alone fall to fully instantiate the conjunctive hy-
pothesis an trout and sparrows. The overall instantiation requirement is violated
so that the comprehensive hypothesis remains without support. The disjunctive
paradox is dismissed in virtue of the fact that the special consequences of an in-
stantiated hypothesis may fall to be instantiated themselves. The hypothesis an
gill-breathing trout is, in fact, confirmed by the observation of gill-breathing
trout Frederick. But these data are unsuitable for instantiating the logical conse-
quence of this hypothesis that is generated by appending a disjunctive clause. Since
this clause remains uninstantiated, the entire hypothesis receives no empirical sup-
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port. This shows that adopting the overall instantiation requirement is tanta-
mount to abandoning the special consequence condition.
It follows that there is no need to retain the consistency condition whose ap-
plication to problems like curve fitting appeared implausible. If consequences of
confirmed hypotheses are no longer supposed to be supported automatically, con-
sistency can be dropped without detrimental effects. Two incompatible hypotheses
may be considered confirmed by the same set of data without having to admit that
everything implied by an inconsistency (that is, arbitrary assumptions) are borne
out as well. Hempel's consistency condition is not part of the bootstrap model.
Let me expound the characteristics of the bootstrap model by briefly turning
to a famous example of confirmation by deduction from the phenomena-
namely, Newton's derivation of a central inverse-square force from Kepler's third
law and his own laws of motion. For reasons of simplicity let us confine to the Gase
of the circular motion of a single planet of mass m orbiting the sun at a distance
r. It follows from Newton's laws of motion that a centripetal force F = mv2/r is
necessary for maintaining the circular motion. That is, this force is exerted from
the sun an the planet. Assume that it takes the period Tfor the planet to complete
one revolution around the sun so that its uniform velocity comes out as v = 27tr/T.
Plugging in this quantity in the equation for the centripetal force gives F = 4n2
mr/T2. Kepler's third law of planetary motion says that the squared periods of rev-
olution are proportional to the cubes of the semimajor axes of the planetary or-
bits. In the simplified case of circular motion under consideration, the semimajor
axis coincides with the radius of the planetary orbit. Kepler's third law thus
amounts to T2 = kr3 (with some constant k). Plugging in yields for the centripetal
force F = 4n2 mr/kr3 = 41t2 m/kr2. The result is that the centripetal force of gravi-
tation decreases with the squared distances from the sun F --1/r2.
This example places essential features of bootstrap confirmation at the focus.
First, the basis of the derivation is Kepler's third law, which is regarded as the rel-
evant "phenomenon." However, it is obvious that this law involves a general claim
and is not to be identified with a single experience. So, what bootstrap confirma-
tion actually amounts to is the derivation of instances of more comprehensive hy-
potheses from more restricted ones.
Second, the procedure essentially draws an the invocation of additional laws
and an the assumption of initial and boundary conditions. The central nomic
premise is the equation of centripetal force that derives from the Newtonian equa-
tion of motion. The factual premise involves the constraint to a single planet. From
these premises the existence of an inverse-square attractive force from the sun to
the planet can be deduced, indeed. This demonstrates the importance of loosening
the demands an the derivation of instantiations of hypotheses from the data. In
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contrast to Hempel, Glymour licenses the intrusion of theory in this process. It is
only through this liberalization that realistic examples can be brought into the scope
of confirmation theory.
Third, in contrast to hypothetico-deductivism, empirical support in the boot-
strap vein concerns specific hypotheses. Glymour shares Hempel's nonholistic
approach to confirmation. These nonholistic features are codified by the overall
instantiation requirement that says only the instantiated parts or aspects of an as-
sumption are confirmed by the relevant data. Let us take hypothetico-deductivism
as a template so as to realize more distinctly the contrasting features of bootstrap
confirmation. Within the hypothetico-deductivist framework, Kepler's third law
is thought to be derived from Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravitation,
along with the relevant initial and boundary conditions. Thus, Kepler's third law is
shown to be a consequence of this set of premises. The empirical success of the law
indiscriminately supports all the premises used in the deduction. Hypothetico-
deductive confirmation is directed at large-scale theoretical networks; it is holistic in
kind. Kepler's third law confirms the "science-wide web" of Newtonian mechanics.
The bootstrap picture is essentially different. The overall instantiation require-
ment entails that confirmation is restricted to the instantiated parts or aspects of
the hypotheses at issue. Conversely, what is not instantiated remains unsupported.
The only part of the law of gravitation that is actually instantiated by the sketched
deduction is the assumption of an inverse-square force from the sun to the planet
in question. Consequently, in virtue of the overall instantiation requirement, this
one assumption alone is confirmed by Kepler's third law. This means, in particu-
lar, that neither the reciprocality nor the universality of gravitation, which are
both essential to the Newtonian conception of gravity, receive any Support from
the third law. Nothing is derived with respect to a force exerted from the planet an
the sun; nothing is deduced as to the forces among various planets. So, it is only a
restricted aspect of the law of gravitation, and by no means the entire network of
Newtonian mechanics, that is confirmed by Kepler's third law. Bootstrap confir-
mation is directed at specific assumptions and is thus nonholistic.?
Glymour joins Hempel in considering qualitative confirmation as central. The
core issue is whether or not a piece of evidence supports a given hypothesis. Just
as in Hempel's original version, additional criteria have to be invoked in order to
assess degrees of confirmation. The comparative or quantitative merits of a hy-
pothesis or theory are only appraised at a later stage of the procedure. Glymour
resorts to Standards such as the paucity of untested hypotheses, the variety of ev-
idence brought to bear an a theory, the uniformity of the explanations achieved,
and so an (Glymour 198o,153-54). Neither Hempel nor Glymour leave any doubt
that qualitative confirmation is insufficient for capturing the whole of hypothesis
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appraisal in the sciences. Further criteria of a nondeductive nature have to be
taken into account in any event. The purpose in this section was to reveal the
strong conceptual ties between the basic principles of Hempel's and Glymour's
approaches. This can be accomplished by focusing exclusively an the fundamental
notion of qualitative confirmation.
Hempel's Paradox of Confirmation
The irrelevance paradoxes, as sketched earlier in this chapter, are not to be con-
fused with what is usually called "Hempel's paradox of confirmation" or "the
ravens paradox." This paradox, in contrast to the irrelevance paradoxes, is not due
to the special consequence condition, but arises from the equivalence condition.
This condition requires that a piece of evidence that supports a hypothesis also
confirms each hypothesis that is logically equivalent with the first one. The catch
is that this not implausible demand has somewhat tricky ramifications. Let the
hypothesis be "all ravens are black." This statement is equivalent to its contrapos-
itive, "all nonblack things are nonravens." A pink elephant is neither black nor a
raven; its observation instantiates and thus certainly supports the latter claim. But
then, in virtue of the equivalence condition, it should also confirm the original
version that all ravens are black-which has a somewhat paradoxical ring (Hempel
1945,12-15).
The entailment approach to confirmation is in no way particularly liable to
Hempel's paradox. After all, the nonravenhood of nonblack things is a conse-
quence of the presumption that all ravens are black, so that pink elephants bear
out this presumption by hypothetico-deductive lights as well. Each theory of con-
firmation is threatened by the difficulty, and the extant literature contains a large
number of attempts to cope with it (Maher 1999, 57-65). The reason 1 briefly want
to go into the matter is that the entailment approach in general, and the bootstrap
model in particular, allows for a natural treatment.
Let me begin by briefly sketching Glymour's own Suggestion for handling the
issue. He requires that genuine confirmation be selective. A hypothesis is borne
out by only such data that do not also indiscriminately confirm alternative hy-
potheses, expressed in the saure concepts as the frrst one but incompatible with it.
What makes the support of the raven hypothesis by the pink elephant appear sus-
pect is that this piece of evidence, using the Same logic, likewise buttresses the
claim that all ravens are green, or that they are yellow and littered with blue spots,
or what have you. After all, pink elephants do not alone constitute nonblack non-
ravens but also nongreen nonravens or nonyellow, nonspotted nonravens. The
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piece of evidence at issue fails to undermine any competing hypothesis. Its confir-
matory impact is highly diffuse and nonselective, and this is the reason why it is
bereft of corroborating force (Glymour 1980,156-60).
I do not deny that the selective-confirmation requirement is plausible and
suitable for coping with the paradox. Still, its acceptance is less than satisfactory
since it involves the introduction of a special condition of adequacy so as to de-
fuse one particular problem. lt would certainly be more appealing to resolve the
difficulty by drawing an the natural virtues of the instantiation account. Each
confirmation theory could invoke the selective-confirmation requirement as ad-
ditional principle; nothing hinges an featuring positive instances as the key to
confirmation. Adopting the condition of selective confirmation does not confer a
selective distinction to the instantiation account.
So let me try to advance bootstrapping a little further. There appears to be a
way out of the quandary that is paved, indeed, by the emphasis an instantiations.
It deserves notice that insistence an instantiations helps avoid the emergence of
the paradox. A pink elephant is no positive instance of the generalization that all
ravens are black and should fall to support it for this reason. The confirmatory force
of such observations wholly derives from the equivalence condition; it does not
arise from the ferst principles of the entailment approach. This constitutes a natural
advantage over hypothetico-deductive theories of confirmation. Whatever the par-
ticulars of such theories may be like, they all subscribe to the converse consequence
condition. This condition embodies the Spirit of hypothetico-deductivism. But
each hypothesis qualifies as a premise for the derivation of its contrapositive so
that each confirmation of the latter is automatically transferred to the hypothesis
itself. No additional condition is needed for generating the paradoxical result.
The bootstrap model, by contrast, demands positive instances. The overall in-
stantiation requirement stipulates that each quantity in the hypothesis in question
must be subject to unique evaluation an the basis of the data. lt follows that non-
instantiated hypotheses receive no support. But the pink elephant is unsuitable
for fixing any quantity in the hypothesis about ravens. It only instantiates the con-
trapositive, not the hypothesis itself. The paradox does not arise in the first place.
lt is obvious that this type of approach exacts renunciation of the equivalence
condition; the very pivot of this treatment is that logically equivalent hypotheses
could be borne out differently. However, in all the benign cases the equivalence
condition is not needed, and in the malign ones it issues in paradoxes. So the con-
dition could or should be dropped, respectively. Consider the law of gravitation:
F = Gmim2/r2. A relevant piece of evidence, such as a given planetary constella-
tion, indiscriminately instantiates all the logically equivalent versions of this equa-
tion: r2 = Gm1m2/F or m1 = Fr2/Gm2. If the quantities are instantiated in one case,
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they are automatically instantiated in the others as well. Demanding equivalence
explicitly is quite superfluous. Problems only emerge with laws in the form of ma-
terial conditionals. To be sure, there are real-life laws of this sort. The law of iner-
tia can be expressed to the following effect: if a body is not subject to any external
force, it performs a uniform rectilinear motion. If the equivalence condition is re-
nounced the curvilinear motion of a body under the action of an external force is
not covered by this law. But there is nothing to worry about that. Noninertial mo-
tion is captured by a different law, the equation of motion. After all, these two
types of situations were treated separately in Newton's original axiomatization of
mechanics; they were addressed by the first and the second law of motion, respec-
tively. If we want to have it one way and the contrapositive way alike, we should
state it both ways.
Abandoning the equivalence condition serves to resolve Hempel's paradox of
confirmation without the need to appeal to a particular, tailor-made requirement.
lt is true that it might prove difficult to extend this treatment to cover comparative
and quantitative notions of confirmation (Maher 1999, 53); but given Hempel's and
Glymour's strategy of placing qualitative confirmation at the top, degrees of con-
firmation are not yet at issue.
Passing an the Torch: Hempel and Glymour
Glymour places his model explicitly in the tradition initiated by Hempel (Glymour
1980,128-29). Hempel's theory of confirmation is said to possess "admirable qual-
ities" but to Buffer from its restriction to simple cases (Glymour 1980, 27). This
supposedly means that Hempel's basic conception is all right but needs to over-
come its limitation to toy propositions of the "all swans are white" variety. What is
called for, Glymour suggests, is to enlarge the framework so as to make real-life
cases tractable.
1 have attempted to point out that the fundamentals of the bootstrap model
are directly linked to Hempel's approach. In the rational reconstruction 1 have
given, the bootstrap tenets are shown to grow naturally out of the deficiencies of
the Hempelian views. Hempel's notion of the development of a hypothesis is
abandoned and Hempel's special consequence condition is dropped (although
Glymour fails to recognize the fatal properties of the latter condition) (Glymour
1980, 132-33, 155, 174). The two are replaced by the overall instantiation require-
ment. So, what Glymour did in 1980 was to take up, pursue, and improve ideas from
the heyday of logical empiricism. The connection is tight, as 1 have tried to argue,
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and it stretches right across the "theory-change period" in which interest in con-
firmation theory proper had dropped off to almost nothing.
Further, none of the criticisms leveled against Hempel's account was substan-
tially connected with the demise of logical empiricism-a change in the philo-
sophical landscape that happened right in between the enunciation of the two
approaches in question. The odd properties of the special consequence condition
could have been noted at any time. And the restriction to observational terms, as
expressed by the commitment to the development of hypotheses, should have ap-
peared inadequate at any point after the acceptance of the double-language model.
This model was advocated by Carnap and Hempel from the 195os onward and in-
volved the claim that science encompassed two linguistic levels-namely, obser-
vational and theoretical terms. Logical empiricists insisted that both levels are to
be kept separate. To be sure, so-called correspondence rules were supposed to es-
tablish links between the two linguistic levels. But since one theoretical term might
be tied to several observational ones and vice versa, the theoretical language was
thought not to be reducible to observation predicates.
The pivotal aspect is that the double-language view is incompatible with the
notion of development. And since Hempel was among the chief proponents of
this view, he himself could have well conceived all the objections that were lfter
directed against this notion. Abandoning the notion of the development of a hy-
pothesis has nothing to do with the transition to postempiricism; the changes
within logical empiricism would have suggested this move anyway. In this area,
nothing hinges an the passage of philosophical time.
Consequently, the bootstrap model smoothly continues the lines Hempel
had drawn in confirmation theory. To be sure, the bootstrap model significantly
modifies Hempel's earlier approach. If the equivalence condition is dropped (as
suggested above), nothing but the entailment condition is left from Hempel's
original version. Ort the other hand, this condition is the key to Hempel's view; it
embodies the very spirit of the entailment account. The severe changes intro-
duced by Glymour do not militate against regarding the bootstrap model as a
continuation of Hempel's conception. Rather, this is how progress in philosophy
is produced. It hardly ever happens that a philosopher takes over another philoso-
pher's views unchanged; and if it happens it is a boring episode that deserves to
pass unnoticed. To take up philosophical ideas in a fruitful fashion means to change
them; fertile philosophical traditions are characterized by frequent alterations.
Philosophical argument thrives an continuing lines of thought by improving
them. As 1 tried to make plausible, this is precisely what is distinctive of the rela-
tionship between Hempel and Glymour. My point is that this testifies to the last-
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ing fecundity of Hempel's views an confirmation. To be philosophically alive is
to be criticized, to be pursued, and to be modified. In this vein, Salmon took up
Hume's challenge to identify causal processes by relying exclusively an conceptual
means acceptable to an empiricist and advocated his process theory of causation
(Salmon 1984,136-37,182-83). Although the result is largely at variance with Hume's
own opinion an the subject, the attempt to meet Hume's challenge bears witness
to the enduring forte of his philosophy. The indication of philosophical fecundity
is not acceptance but the power to stimulate new thoughts. 1 hope to have shown
that Hempel's theory of confirmation passes this test easily.
It follows that it is unjustified to pass in silence over Hempel's contributions
to confirmation theory when it comes to appraising the "spirit of logical empiri-
cism" (Salmon 1999). lt is true that Hempel, in the 1964 postscript to his original
article, lists objections to his proposal and comes dose to abandoning the entire
project in favor of Carnap's inductive logic: "My general formal definition of
qualitative confirmation now seems to me rather too restrictive.... Perhaps the
problem of formulating adequate criteria of qualitative confirmation had best be
tackled, after all, by means of the quantitative concept of confirmation. This has
been suggested especially by Carnap" (Hempel 1945 [19641, 48-49,5o). Analogously,
Hempel does not even mention his own earlier efforts in the chapter an confirma-
tion in his introductory Philosophy of Natural Science of 1966. Instead, Carnap's
inductive logic is presented as a promising approach (Hempel 1966, 45-46). The
foregoing considerations suggest that Hempel should have stuck to his earlier views
more tenaciously. The theory in its original shape could not be upheld; it was
bound to collapse. But there were jewels to be found in the debris.
Notes
1. The special consequence condition implies the equivalence condition since equiva-
lence amounts to reciprocal implication (Hempel 1945, 21). For this reason, the adoption of
the special consequence condition makes it superfluous to adduce the equivalence condi-
tion as a separate constraint.
2. In view of the fact that the two sets of conditions are part of incongruous ap-
proaches to confirmation, it is a queer endeavor to probe into options for nevertheless rec-
onciling the converse consequence condition with Hempel's conditions of entailment and
special consequence-as Le Morvan (1999) does.
3. The relevant logical rule is p A q p - q.
4. For this reason the restriction to a finite domain of application is inessential and
could be dropped. To be sure, the development of a hypothesis cannot be stated compre-
hensively for an infinite class of objects, but an observation statement could still imply
those parts of the development that deal with the objects mentioned in the statement.
5. lt is important to realize that the argument does not invoke the converse conse-
quence condition. Hempel used a reply to this effect in order to rebut a similar but more
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schematic objection. Let an observation e tonfirm a hypothesis hl; then e might be thought
also to tonfirm h = hl n h2 where h2 may be completely irrelevant to e. However, as Hempel
replies, the move from the confirmation of h, to the confirmation of h tacitly appeals to the
converse consequence condition that appeal is illicit in the framework of the instantiation
account (Hempel 1945,33).
But in the more detailed scenario sketched in the text, the corresponding move to the
confirmation of the conjunctive hypothesis is not licensed by the converse consequence
condition but by drawing more specifically an the concept of the development of a hypoth-
esis. In the example given in the text, the piece of evidente directly confirms the conjunctive
hypothesis in question. No auxiliary recourse to any general condition is necessary.
6. If a hypothesis h entails evidente e, the conjunction of this hypothesis with some ir-
relevant clause i likewise entails e: h - e h n i - e (Glymour 1980, 31).
7. See Carrier (1994, 56-61) for another, more extensively discussed example of boot-
strapping.
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Scientific Rationality
Changing Conceptions of Rationality
From Logical Empiricism to Postpositivism
GÜROL IRZIK
Bogazifi University
One of the central issues that came into focus in the sixties and the seventies with
the transition from the logical empiricist to the postpositivist philosophy of sci-
ence was scientific change. This issue was bound to arise when a historical-devel-
opmental approach to science replaced a logico-structural one adopted by the
logical empiricists. It involved, among others, questions such as these: How does
scientific change occur? What sort of criteria, Standards, or norms are employed
in preferring one scientific theory over another? Are they fixed and universal or
local and historically changing? Clearly, these are questions about the rationality
of science, and while they interested the logical empiricists and received consider-
able attention by the falsificationists, they became the Center of stormy debates
only after the publication of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientfic Revolutions
in 1962.
As the questions in the preceding paragraph indicate, these rationality debates
were at the same time debates about scientific methodology, which was typically
understood as laying out the rules that govern scientific practice-in particular,
the acceptance of a theory or the choice among alternative theories. The relation-
ship between methodology and rationality was taken to be straightforward: if the
methodology involved, say, rules like "always formulate your conjectures boldly
and test them severely," it was rational to prefer the hypothesis that was bolder and
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